The Hub - Ireland is bent so lets unbend it

 

The Hub Ireland is calling on newly elected TDs to follow some practical points to alleviate the suffering thousands of families are subjected as a result of mortgage debt, the banking system and government ineptitude or inability to do anything about the root causes.  The Hub says that it's wish list is not exhaustible but is achievable and are calling on people to apply pressure on local TDs.
 

The Hub-Ireland, 21 Little Mary Street, Dublin 7, 01 534 9118 - http://www.thehub-ireland.com/

The Hub-Ireland, 21 Little Mary Street, Dublin 7, 01 534 9118 - http://www.thehub-ireland.com/


Suggestions For Our Representatives

The separation of power between the Registrar and the Sheriff.

A separate office and distinction between the Registrar and Sheriff, no poundage on possession!

A complaints board before a judicial review against the action of the County Registrar.

The suspension of the pooling system of solicitors in the Circuit Court.

A suspension of all eviction and ejectment notices for two years to allow a resolve to the present crisis to fully unfold.

A halt to receivership where the local business is viable but for debt that the banks erroneously added: allow Ireland to recover.

A mechanism to ensure observation of Circuit Court and High Court rules.

A mechanism to stop the banks selling ‘toxic’ loans.

A control mechanism to stop vulture funds buying loans at €0.19 cent in the €uro and demanding 100 % of the loan value.

More control over the institutions of the Land Registry Ireland, the Companies Registration Office and the Valuations Office: making them more accountable to the people of Ireland and the justice System.

 

 

The Hub- click image opposite to go to it's facebook page

Following graph and info from 'Failure of Irish Politics' by Padraig O'Mara
 

                                Graph from 'Failure of Irish Politics' by Padraig O'Mara  

                                Graph from 'Failure of Irish Politics' by Padraig O'Mara

 

 

Padraig O'Mara in 'Failure of Irish Politics' said“vulture funds are preparing to pull the trigger on hundreds of business foreclosures and property receiverships in the aftermath of the election”

This is certainly consistent with news in late 2015 that the Government had ordered county registrars to lay off on evictions until after the election, for fear of a voter backlash.



They Marched Us To The Top Of The Hill And They Marched Us Down Again

Article by Enda Craig

     

Unrealistic promises

When a political party arrives at a final policy position it is mostly after a huge amount of research.    The party's strategists factor into their final composition as much difficulty as possible for the opposition.   Sizing up the enemy to get the upper hand, they  gear policies to this or that target group, offer this or that incentive and possibly use unsuspecting pressure groups to further their own goals.  Understanding the market is one thing but pressurizing your foes is as important. 

However, the hatched schemes and the offer of goodies usually present some important decisions to be taken.  If a policy, agreed on as strategy,  presents an advantage to the party and to boot it generates difficulties for the opposition,  it may also make things difficult for supporters.  The result is a moral dilemma.   On the one hand it pressurises the opposite parties into offering more  but on the other hand it alienates supporters by not fulfilling  the promised policies.

Consider the following situation

1.  Let's say all along the party doesn't want to be in government, that it is not ready to take power and that it would  be best served by being the main opposition.   The party  pretends that it wants to go into government, but by making it impossible to do so electorally, the party knows that this will never happen. 

2. This opens the door to the possibility of a huge 'hoodwink' as it can promise the world, knowing that it will never have to deliver on the promises.  The policies will be popular.  They will take support away from opposite parties and  will put pressure on them to outdo the promises.   

3. The desire to gain advantage and crucify the opposition now takes over and becomes  the priority.  This is achieved by making monumental popular promises and cloaking them in flimsy and flaky  economic costings.  The details gets lost in the headline announcements and few people question them.

4. The party can now put together an 'a la carte' menu of big time promises.  This  will boost  ratings among  present supporters and  attract substantial new voters.  By extension it will achieve the high popular ground.  Most people only look at the headlines and care less  about the detailed economic or political ramifications.

5.  Opposition parties stand open mouthed at the brazen content of these promises.  They quickly find their opposite number is  gaining popularity from the public at large.  In a panic they decide to react  realising that their arguments pointing out the deficiencies  are gaining them nothing.

6. Rather than continue on the truthful road they now begin to promise the same and maybe more as the enemy.  They know it is totally disingenuous, untruthful and possibly undeliverable.  It is the same as the opposition but the spiraling race for power knows no bounds or morality.  All that matters now is the bottom line - success at the ballot box

7. But will there be a day of reckoning built into this situation, especially for the side who would slaver at the thought  of attaining power?

8. Fianna Fail's  policy promises  are now eagerly awaited by the unsuspecting multitudes.  Their Achilles heel now lies exposed.   Their spinners and magicians are already hard at work putting a gloss on a possible u-turn.  The finished product is anyone's guess.

 9. Meanwhile the initial promoters of this shameful strategy are on the moral high-ground, sticking to principles.  They are  now tooled up and lie in ambush for Michael and his merry bunch.   The time of reckoning is at hand.  The Pantomime plays on and the abuse of the people continues.

No, closing Irish Water won’t cost €7b

Brian M. Lucey is Professor of Finance at the School of Business, Trinity College Dublin.   He can be contacted by email on blucey@tcd.ie or on +353 1 8961552. He also write a fortnightly column on matters economic and financial in the Irish Ex…

Brian M. Lucey is Professor of Finance at the School of Business, Trinity College Dublin.   He can be contacted by email on blucey@tcd.ie or on +353 1 8961552. He also write a fortnightly column on matters economic and financial in the Irish Examiner

 

Closing Irish water wont cost €7b, nor anything like it. Today we read, based on internal (and therefore of course unbiased …) documents from Irish Water that to close it would cost “up to €7b).

No, it wont

We are told the four cost headings are

cash costs, sunk costs, benefits forgone and the lost possibility of getting its debts off the exchequer’s books.

Of these cash costs are €100m. The sunk costs are about €500m for the meters (which of course Siemens would have installed for free…) and an eye-watering €170m for IT and other systems to administer. The other costs are given as €1.6b in foregone charges to 2021 and a vague and unspecified €1.6b in “savings” which Irish water would make. I cant see €7b there but just over €4b- the remaining €3b must be from savings that would be made on state debt service if and when IW was “off books”, which it is not of course.

Closing IW is an investment decision. Lets look at this.

First, any investment decision must discount. No discounting seems evident here. If we are to get €1.6b in charges over the next 5 years, or €320m per annum, these must be discounted. The today, or present, value of a  5y annuity of €320m depends on the interest or discount rate. Right now the interest rate on the national debt is about 4%. That gives a present value of €1.4b. But in IW land what is €200m between friends. Actually, its €400m if we treat the other €1.6b in the same way. So its not €7b but €6.6b to close. Lets move on

Second, in investment decision making, for the investment, only incremental costs are relevant. These are costs that will change depending on the go/no go decision. Thus sunk costs are, to the decision to close IW or not, irrelevant. To be sure, they must be paid for, but they are sunk, and irretrievable regardless of IW continued existence or otherwise. So we have to take off the cost of closure at least another €670m reducing the cost to €6b.

Third, the cash costs, these are real.

Fourth, the €3b in missing costs, attributable it seems to savings on the national debt. Two issues arise here. IW is NOT and will not for some considerable time be off the books. So any costs from it not existing in the future and the costs of water being on the state are, at best, probabilistic. They should be discounted by some % to reflect the likelihood. Second, the savings would appear to be a lump sum value of some savings per annum. Some discounting on that would be needed. So we perhaps might reduce this cost from €3b to , lets do a Drummer, €1b. Total cost now €4b.

But wait…if we don't have IW we wont need the “water conservation grant”.  That costs just a tad under €100m per annum. If we assume that it will last forever then its present value, at 4% is €2.5b. If we use the 5y horizon IW seem to use its €445m.  Total cost of closing IW now is €1.5-3.5b.

All of this assumes of course that the charges wont in some way be recouped in tax, that the meters wont be ever used etc. But even if we assume that, there is no way, from the figures presented, that closing IW would cost €7b, but rather a small % of same. Once again IW seems to have its numbers cockeyed.